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Developing a Coherent Theory of
the Structure of Federal Rule of

Evidence 703
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
"Ifyou wish to converse with me, [first] define your terms."
-Voltaire'

Some commentators have suggested that the American judicial
hearing is becoming trial by expert. As recently as 1974, the Jury
Verdict Reporter for Cook County, Illinois, listed only 188 regularly
testifying experts? "Today, there are more than 3,100-a 1,540 percent
increase.' In the late 1980s, the Cook County state courts averaged
one expert per trial.' In some areas, the trend is even more pronounced. In the early 1990s, the Rand Corporation released a study of
the use of experts in trials in California courts of general jurisdiction.6
Expert witnesses appeared in eighty-six percent of the trials studied, an
average of 3.3 experts per trial.'
There is concern about the number of expert witnesses appearing in
trials; however, more importantly, there is concern about the quality of
the testimony which these witnesses proffer.8 In his 1991 text, Galileo's
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; Former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools. University of San Francisco (B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969).
1. THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 428 (Burton Stevenson
ed., 10th ed. 1967).
2. William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the US, 145 NEW L.J. 82 (Jan. 27, 1995).
3. Andrew Blum, Experts: How Good Are They?, NATL L.J., July 24, 1989, at 1, 38.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1120 n.19 (1991).
7. Id. at 1119.
S. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of
Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993); Jon P. Thames, It's Not
Bad Law-It's Bad Science: Problems with Expert Testimony in Trial Proceedings,19 AM.
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Revenge, the Manhattan Institute's Peter Huber leveled the charge that
much of this expert testimony is "junk science."9 The debate over this
charge was spirited and sometimes bitter.'0
This'debate spilled over into the courts." In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court joined the debate by rendering its decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 2 Daubert became a cause celebre.
Even before the Court handed down its decision, the media fixed on the
case."' The
subsequent decision was greeted with intense media
14
attention.
The level of attention was understandable. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court abandoned the traditional general acceptance standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence."5 The standard
dated back to the 1923 Frye 6 test, which announced that an expert
witness could not base testimony on a scientific technique unless the
technique enjoys general acceptance in the pertinent scientific circles. 7
The test was not only hoary; it had also been widespread. At one time,
the general acceptance test appeared to be the law in at least forty-five
states."8 Nevertheless, the Court stated that it could find no language
in the Federal Rules of Evidence codifying a general acceptance
standard. 9 The Court reasoned that by enacting the statutory rules

J. TRIAL ADV. 545 (1995).
9. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).

10. See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo'sRetort: PeterHuber'sJunk Scholarship,42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
11. In his 1991 and 1995 decisions in Daubert,Judge Kozinski cited Mr. Huber's text.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 1, 1995) (No. 95-198); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (Oct. 13, 1993) (No.
92-102), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
12. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
13. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision on the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: The Supreme Court Choosesthe Right Piecefor All the EvidentiaryPuzzles, 9 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 5, 6 n.5 (1993) (collecting articles).

14. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
EpistemologicalApproach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 n.3 (1994) (collecting articles).
15. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
16. Id. at 2792.
17. 1 PAUL C. GIANELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE § 1-5 (2d
ed. 1993).
18. Betty R. Steingass, note, Changing the Standard For Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979).,
19. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
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without codifying the general acceptance standard, Congress had
impliedly abolished the standard.2 °
To fashion a new standard to govern the admissibility of scientific
testimony, the Court turned to the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
That statute reads: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise."21 The Court focused on the expression,
"scientific... knowledge" and refused to equate the expression with a
body of immutably true, substantive propositions. 22 Rather, the Court
opted for a methodological definition, explaining that testimony which
qualifies as "scientific ... knowledge" admissible under Rule 702, if the
expert's theory is the product of sound scientific methodology.23 The
Court elaborated that scientific methodology entails the formulation of
hypotheses and subsequent conducting of observation or experimentation
to disprove or validate the hypotheses. 4
By deriving the new standard from the statutory language, "scientific
..knowledge," the decision in Daubert spotlighted Rule 702. However,

in truth another statute, Rule 703, has been the most controversial
aspect of expert testimony provisions in the Federal Rules.25 Rule 703
provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.' 6

Although it has been more than two decades since the Federal Rules of
Evidence took effect in 1975,2" many thorny questions about the
interpretation of Rule 703 persist. 28 As Part II of this Article notes,
20. Id.
21. FED. R. EviD. 702.
22. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 n.2 (1984) (citing J.
WEINSTEiN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 703[021 at 703-09 (1982)) [hereinafter

Carlson, Collision Course].
26. FED. R. EviD. 703.
27. JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of FederalRule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 53, 54 (1994).
28. Id.
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there are five major splits of authority over the proper construction of
Rule 703.29 Thirty-eight states have evidence codes directly patterned
after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although the majority of those
states adopted the federal version of Rule 703 without change, a number
of states have amended their version of Rule 703.0 Citing the controversies swirling around Rule 703 as a concern, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decided against adopting the rule for use in that
state.3 1
The purpose of this Article is to help resolve those controversies. This
Article's thesis is that the courts must resolve the threshold dispute over
the meaning of "[the facts or data in the particular case," 2 before they
can hope to intelligently dispose of the other four splits of authority. On
occasion, some writers have at least passingly recognized a possible
nexus among the various issues.33 However, for the most part, the
commentators have been content to discuss individual issues, without
endeavoring to develop a coherent theory of the structure of Rule 703. 3'
Hopefully, this Article will aid the courts and commentators in seeing
the interconnected nature of all five splits of authority over Rule 703.
Part I of the Article delves into the key dispute over the meaning of
"facts or data in the particular case."35 Part II describes each of the
remaining four splits of authority. In addition, Part II demonstrates
that each split relates back to the dispute over the meaning of "facts or
data." To paraphrase Voltaire, if we are to have a productive conversation about Rule 703, we must first define our terms. On a previous
occasion, I stated my position on the definition of "facts or data."3 s The
purpose of this Article is not to reiterate that position. Instead, my

29. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Federal Rule of Evidence 703-A
Minefield for the CriminalLitigator,31 CRIM. L. BULL. 259 (May-June 1995) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Minefield].
30.

2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA:

THE

FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES ch. 52 (1987 & Supp. 1994).

31. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as HearsayConduits: ConfrontationAbuses in Opinion
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 867 (1992) (quoting Department of Youth Servs. v. A
Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (Mass. 1986)) [hereinafter Carlson, Conduits].
32.

FED. R. EVID. 703.

33. See Carlson, Collision Course,supra note 25, at 60; Carlson, Conduits, supra note
31, at 870-71; Epps, supra note 27, at 75.
34. E.g., Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basisfor Expert Opinion Testimony:
A Response to ProfessorCarlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987).
35.

FED. R. EvID. 703.

36. Edward J.Imwinkelried, The Meaningof'Factsor Data'inFederalRule ofEvidence
703: The Significanceof the Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on FederalRule of Evidence
702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REV. 352 (1995)
[hereinafter Imwinkelried, Facts or Data].
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intent is to help the courts appreciate that they must stake out a
position on this dispute in order to sensibly resolve the other splits of
authority. The courts must come to understand the need to formulate
a coherent theory of Rule 703; and, as we shall see, a central tenet of
that theory must be a definition of "facts or data in the particular case."
I.

THE THRESHOLD DISPuTE OVER THE SCOPE OF RULE 703: THE
MEANING OF THE "FACTS OR DATA IN THE PARTICULAR CASE"

The fundamental dispute is whether the expression, "the facts or data
in the particular case, "a7 is limited to case-specific information or
whether the expression also embraces research data.38 To illustrate the
distinction, consider the Daubertfact pattern. In that case, the plaintiffs
were Mr. and Mrs. Daubert and their son, Jason. During the first
trimester of her pregnancy with Jason, Mrs. Daubert had used the
defendant's antinausea drug, Bendectin. Jason was subsequently born
with serious limb defects. The plaintiffs argued generally that Bendectin
is capable of causing such limb defects and specifically that Bendectin
was the cause of the defects which Jason suffered. The plaintiffs offered
several types of evidence to establish general causation, including in
vitro (test tube) research, in vivo animal studies, and pharmacological
analyses comparing the chemical structure of Bendectin with that of
other substances known to cause birth defects. 9 In addition, the
plaintiffs attempted to introduce testimony about an epidemiological reanalysis of the drug. They conceded that the published epidemiological
analyses did not show a statistically significant correlation between the
use of Bendectin and congenital limb defects. However, their experts
contended that after the data in the published studies was pooled (a
meta-analysis), a re-analysis yielded a statistically significant, and
therefore potentially causal, relationship.4 °
There is agreement that the validation test, which the Daubert Court
derived from Rule 702, governs the question of the validity of the
technique of epidemiological re-analysis. 4' However, the unsettled
question is which of the remaining components of the expert's reasoning
process are governed by Rule 703. One view is that 703 governs
everything else, including all the questions related to the research data

37. FED. R. EviD. 703.

38. See Imwinkelried, Facts or Data,supra note 36.
39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791-92 (1993).
40. Id.
41. Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's 'Focus' Seriously: The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L, REV. 1745 (1994) [hereinafter Chesebro,

Daubert's 'Focus'].
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re-evaluated by the plaintiff's experts in their meta-analysis.4 2 For
example, was the size of the research database adequate, and were the
individual studies which were pooled sufficiently comparable to permit
meta-analysis?
The competing view is that those questions about reseach data fall
under Rule 702, and that Rule 703 applies only to case-specific
information. To make out a submissible tort case, the plaintiffs had to
prove specific, as well as general, medical causation; they relied on their
experts to prove both. In addition to testifying on the general medical
causation issue of whether Bendectin can cause limb defects, the
plaintiffs' experts proposed testimony regarding specific medical
causation; they contemplated opining that given Mrs. Daubert's use of
Bendectin and the type of defects which Jason incurred, Bendectin was
the likely cause of Jason's limb deficits. 4 Under the competing view,
Rule 703 would govern only the question of whether a proper basis
existed for the plaintiffs' experts to assume that Mrs. Daubert ingested
Bendectin (as opposed to another product), and that Jason suffered from
the specific types of defects which Bendectin is capable of causing. Part
of the mission of Rule 702 would be to govern the resolution of the
technical, properly scientific questions."
A. The Broad View that Rule 703 Governs the Questions Related to
the Research "Data"Supporting the Findingof General Medical
Causation
There is certainly a case to be made for this view. The case can be
constructed from the text, context, and legislative history of Rule 703.
The title and body of Rule 703 refer to the "bases" of the expert's
opinion-a term expansive enough to include the research data the
expert relies upon.4 The Dauberts' experts' opinion that Bendectin
caused Jason's limb defects rested in part on the research data reanalyzed by the experts. In a broad sense then, the experts' assumptions about the adequacy and quality of the research data were bases for
their ultimate opinion.
The context of Rule 703 (other parts of the statutory scheme) lends
some support to the expansive reading of "facts or data." As the

42.

Id.

43. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
44.

Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36.

45. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony: The
Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Bases].

1996]

FEDERAL RULE OFEVIDENCE 703

453

Dauberts argued in their reply brief before the Supreme Court, 46 at

least at first blush, Rule 702 seems to answer only two questions: Is
this witness qualified as an expert on this subject, and is there a
genuine need for expert opinion testimony on this subject? Common
sense suggests, though, that to ensure the reliability of the opinion,
there must be some regulation of the validity of the expert's reasoning
process. 47 If Rule 702 does not furnish that regulation, by default, the
courts must look elsewhere. With the exception of Rule 703, none of the
other provisions in Article VII contains language that could be stretched
to regulate the validity of the expert's reasoning. The wording of Rule
703, "facts or data," then becomes an even more attractive candidate.
Further, one passage in the legislative history of Rule 703 points
toward the conclusion that it was intended to regulate the validity of the
reasoning process. The passage in question appears in the official
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703. In pertinent part, the Note
states: "The rule... offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the
admissibility of public opinion poll evidence. Attention is directed to the
validity of the techniques employed rather than to relatively fruitless
inquiries whether hearsay is involved.'
As Mr. Justice Kennedy pointed out in his lead opinion in Tome v.
United States,49 in the past the Supreme Court has tended to attach
great weight to the Notes as evidence of legislative intention. The Notes
were not only prepared by a distinguished committee of judges,
practitioners, and academics, they also accompanied the draft Federal
Rules throughout the Congressional deliberations on the rules. The
reference to "validity" in the Rule 703 Note is some evidence that the
validity question falls within the ambit of that statute.
It would be fair to say that at least prior to the 1993 decision in
Daubert, the majority view was that Rule 703 applied to both the casespecific, and research data, which the expert's opinion is based upon.50
In a large number of cases, the courts treated Rule 703 as supplying the
analytic frame of reference to evaluate the scientific literature,"'

46. Reply Brief of Petitioners, at 9, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
47. See John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting
Expert Testimony by Restrictionsof Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 0R. L. REV. 349
(1992).
48. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note; see also Robert Bonynge, Trademark
Surveys and Techniques and Their Use in Litigation, 48 A.B.A. J. 329 (1962).
49. 115 S. Ct. 696, 702 (1995).
50. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 360-61.
51. Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Nanda v.
Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 222 (7th Cir. 1974)); State v. Valley, 571 A.2d 579, 581, 582
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research, 2 statistical analyses,"3 laboratory tests, 4 and other studies," underpinning the expert's opinion. In their reply brief before the
Supreme Court, the Dauberts pointed out that all the lower courts had
cited Rule 703 precedents as the basis for evaluating the validity of the
plaintiffs' experts' reasoning.5 Indeed, in the lower courts, Merrell
Dow itself had relied on Rule 703 as the foundation for its argument.57
B. The Narrow View that Rule 703 Governs Only the Questions
Related to the Case-Specific Information Supporting the Finding of
Special Medical Causation
Although most courts have ruled that "data" in Rule 703 extends to
research data such as the epidemiological data re-analyzed in Daubert,
there is a minority view, under which data refers to only case-specific
information." The identity of the drug Mrs. Daubert consumed and
the nature of Jason's limb defects--facts essential to proving special
causation in Daubert-areillustrative.
There are persuasive reasons for preferring the minority view. The
minority view has some footing in the text of Rule 703 which does not
refer generally to "the facts or data.. .'upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference." Rather, the phrasing is "the facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference."5 9
The popular, dictionary meaning of "particular" is "relating to a single
person or thing."0 The pooled epidemiological data was neither
particular nor peculiar to Daubert. There were over 2,000 Bendectin
lawsuits. 6 The testimony about Bendectin research data would be
equally relevant and admissible in all 2,000 trials.

n.3 (Vt. 1989).
52. Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1990).
53. See State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824,829,830 n.5 (Me. 1978); State v. Payne, 402 S.E.2d
582, 594 (N.C. 1991), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1405 (1995).
54. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bean), 533 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D.
Colo. 1980).
55. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 503 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983); Mannino v.
International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981); Hagen v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 697 F. Supp. 334, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Prechtel v. Gonse, 396 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Minn.
App. 1986).
56. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 12, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
57. Id.
58. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 360-61.
59. FED. R. EVID. 703.
60.
61.

WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 614 (1972).
Peter W. Huber, Science on Trial, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 604.
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The minority view can also be grounded in the context of Rule 703.
Like Rule 703, Rule 705 is situated within Article VII and therefore
serves as part of the context of Rule 703. Rule 705 provides: "The
expert may testify in terms of opinion and give reasons therefore without
first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 2 Significantly, Rule
705 contains the identical expression as Rule 703, that is, "facts or data."
When a legislature uses the same language in two statutes, the courts
normally assume that the legislature intended the language to mean the
same thing in both statutes.6
The structure of Rule 705 strongly suggests that facts or data, in that
statute, denotes case-specific information. On its face, the first sentence
of the statute allows the expert to state the "reasons" for her opinion
without stating the underlying facts or data. However, interpreting
"facts or data" as including all the research data virtually drains reasons
of any possible meaning. Most components of the expert's reasoning
would be subsumed under "facts or data," and the expert could therefore
withhold any description of those components on direct examination. In
Daubert the result would be that the entire direct examination could be
the witness's bald assertion: "My epidemiological re-analysis proved that
Bendectin causes limb defects like the ones Jason Daubert suffers from."
It seems absurd to characterize such testimony as the full statement of
"reasons" which Rule 705 mandates. It is far more sensible to conclude
that reasons include not only an identification of the methodology
employed, epidemiological re-analysis, but also a specification of the
research data the methodology was used to analyze, the pooled
epidemiological data. The facts or data in Rule 705 would be the casespecific information about the identity of the drug Mrs. Daubert ingested
and the specific limb deficits Jason incurred. Again, if "facts or data" in
Rule 705 has that meaning, it presumably has the same meaning in
Rule 703.
Two passages in the Advisory Committee Note to 703 strengthen the
case for the minority view. In one passage, the Note gives examples of
the types of information which constitute facts or data under Rule 703.
The passage alludes to "statements by patients and relatives, reports
and opinions from nurses, technicans and other doctors, hospital records,
and X-rays." 8" All these examples are case-specific information: "a

62. FED. R. EviD. 705.

63. Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896
(1987); Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1987).

64. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.

456

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

patient's statement that he experienced pain, a report by a relative that
the patient complained about pain, a nurse's opinion that the patient
was in pain, a hospital record quoting the patient's complaint about
pain, or an X-ray showing the possible cause of the pain."' The Note
adds that in certain circumstances, an accident reconstruction expert
might be able to base an opinion on the statement of a bystander to the
accident." The bystander's statement would unquestionably be casespecific information. The Note makes no mention of generalized
scientific research or studies.
•Moreover, the thrust of the Note makes it reasonably clear that the
drafters' intent was to create a new, workable alternative to the
hypothetical question.6 7 Merrell Dow made that very point in its brief
to the Court." A hypothetical question in Daubert might be worded:
Professor, I want you to assume the following facts. (1) Mrs. Daubert
regularly ingested an anti-nausea drug during her first trimester. (2)
That drug was Bendectin. (3) Jason Daubert was born as a result of
that pregnancy. And (4) at the time of birth, Jason's limbs were
deformed. Based on those facts, do you have an opinion as to the cause
of Jason's limb defects? 9

The witness would apply his or her expertise-.-"scientific ...

knowl-

edge"--to evaluate those facts and opine based on that evaluation.
However, suppose that the plaintiffs' attorney tried to add a fifth fact to
the hypothesis:
"[Elpidemiological studies show that there is a
statistically significant relationship between maternal use of Bendectin
and birth defects."7" Any judge in her right mind would sustain an
objection to that phrasing. It is the expert who is supposed to contribute
the scientific knowledge to the fact-finding process. "It is wrong-minded
for the attorney's hypothesis to tell the expert what scientific data to
assume."7' Hence, the hypothesis should be confined to case-specific
data.
If Rule 703 merely creates an alternative to the hypothetical
question-another way of providing the expert with the facts or data to
be evaluated-the scope of the rule should be limited to case-specific
information. Concededly, Rule 703 makes it unnecessary for the expert's

65. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 371.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Respondent at 18, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
69. Imwinkelried, Factsor Data, supra note 36, at 371-72.
70. Id. at 372.
71. Id.
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proponent to put a hypothetical question to the expert and formally
introduce technically admissible evidence to support every element of the
hypothesis; so long as it is customary in the expert's specialty to consider
a particular source of information, the expert may generally rely on
hearsay reports from that type of source even if the reports are
However, there is no indication in the
technically inadmissible.
legislative history of Rule 703 that the drafters intended to reverse the
roles of attorney and expert, allowing the former to tell the latter which
amounts and types of research data suffice to validate a scientific
Whether assumed hypothetically, or established by
hypothesis.
customary sources of information, the facts or data in Rule 703 ought to
be restricted to case-specific data.
As previously stated, although there is some respectable authority for
the restrictive interpretation of Rule 703,72 this interpretation is a
distinct minority view.7 3 The view is somewhat more popular among
academic commentators.74
II.

THE OTHER FOUR SPLITS OF AUTHORITY OVER THE

INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

703

Part I described the threshold dispute over the meaning of the
expression, "facts or data" in Rule 703. That dispute is only one of five
major splits of authority over Rule 703 currently troubling the courts.
The thesis of this Article is that the remaining four splits of authority
cannot be intelligently resolved until the courts have settled the
definition of facts or data. To further develop that thesis, Part II
reviews the other four splits of authority. Part II describes each split,
and then explains how the resolution of that split turns, at least in part,
on the antecedent question of the meaning of "facts or data."
A. Split of Authority #1: Whether a Testifying Expert May Purport to
Base His or Her Opinion on an Identical CorroborativeOpinion by a
Nontestifying Expert
The Split of Authority. Although the first sentence of Rule 703
begins with the pivotal expression, "the facts or data in the particular

72. See Shuchman v. Stackable, 555 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct.) appeal denied, 561
N.E.2d 708 (Ill. 1990); Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 360-61 (citing
Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991);
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring, and Reavley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992)).
73. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data,supra note 36, at 360.
74. See Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 870; see Epps, supra note 27, at 70, 75, 77.

[Vol. 47

MERCER LAW REVIEW

458

case," 5 the sentence continues with statutory language which has
triggered another split of authority. In its entirety, the sentence reads:
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing.""6 The sentence seems to refer in
sweeping terms to any material on which, in a general sense, the expert
"bases" his or her opinion.
Exactly how sweepingly should that reference be interpreted? The
courts agree that in forming an opinion, a testifying expert may build
upon a subsidiary opinion furnished by another, nontestifying expert.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 states that "a physician in his
own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources
including... opinions from nurses [and] technicians ....
i..,

"7

Thus,

after considering a nurse's opinion that the patient's breathing pattern
was abnormal, a treating physician might draw the further inference
that the patient had a particular viral infection. Or, after considering
a toxicological technican's findings, a forensic pathologist could draw a
further inference as to cause of death." In each case, the testifying
expert considers a lower-level opinion on a subsidiary issue, builds upon
it, and draws a-second inference or opinion.
Suppose, however, that in Daubert the plaintiffs had sought recovery
for a psychiatric injury allegedly suffered by Mrs. Daubert; they alleged
that Mrs. Daubert sustained the injury as a result of the anguish caused
by her realization of the extent of Jason's limb defects. There might be
agreement in psychiatric circles on the theory of general causation, and
there may even be consensus that this sort of psychological shock could
trigger the very species of psychosis from which Mrs. Daubert now
suffers. To prove special causation, the plaintiffs call a mental health
expert who discounts other possible causes in Mrs. Daubert's medical
history and opines that Jason's birth, and the consequent anguish,
caused Mrs. Daubert's mental state. Could the testifying expert bolster
her opinion by stating she consulted another expert who concurred that
Jason's birth was the catalyst for Mrs. Daubert's psychosis, and that the
testifying expert partially "bases" her opinion on the nontestifying
expert's opinion?79 In this hypothetical, the testifying expert is not

75. FED. R. EVID. 703.
76. Id.

77. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
78. 2 PAUL C. GINELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE

§ 20-5(C)

(2d ed. 1993).
79. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 247, (in which the expert on the stand

attempted to testify that "I would say that Doctor Rada is in concurrence with my opinion
in this case.") (quoting State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982)).
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building upon a subsidiary opinion of the nontestifying expert. Rather,
both opinions speak to the identical question; the testifying expert is
referring to the other opinion to corroborate her own opinion. Does Rule
703 contemplate the admission of such corroborative opinions as well as
subsidiary opinions?
The jurisdictions are split over this question.' Some courts admit
corroborative opinions.81 In particular, several courts have condoned
this practice in cases involving psychiatric and land valuation experts.82
However, other jurisdictions have prohibited this use of Rule 703. These
courts refuse to permit the testifying expert to function as a conduit for
the identical opinion of the nontestifying expert." In these courts,
although an expert may build upon a subsidiary opinion, the expert may
not parrot a nontestifying expert's opinion on the same subject.
The Relationship Between the Resolution of this Split of
Authority and the Question of the Scope of Rule 703. On the one
hand, under the broad view of the scope of Rule 703, it would make
eminently good sense to admit some corroborative opinions. According
to this view, facts or data include research data. Suppose, for instance,
that the question is one of general causation: Is there an adequate
scientific showing that experiencing the type of anguish Mrs. Daubert
suffered can trigger the specific psychosis which she now alleges? The
hypothesis is that there can be such a causal link, and the mental health
expert on the stand is vouching for the validity of this hypothesis. It
would be proper for that expert to testify that another researcher had
also concluded that the hypothesis is valid.
After a scientist conducts an experiment or engages in observations to
test a hypothesis, the scientist not only privately records her findings,4
she also publishes the findings to permit the replication of the test.8
The publication facilitates peer review of the test of the hypothesis.88
The fact that another researcher has duplicated the test and reached an
identical conclusion is relevant in deciding whether the hypothesis has

80. Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 865 n.39 (collecting conflicting authorities);
Imwinkelried, Minefield, supra note 29, at 262-63 (collecting authorities).
81. Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 865 n.39.
82. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 239.
83. Id. at 241 n.24, 244, 248; Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 864 n.30.
84. ERNEST E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 38-39 (1969). See J.W.
Osterburg, The Scientific Method and CriminalInvestigation,9 J. POL. Sci. &ADMIN. 135
(1981).
85. Bert Black, et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 785 (1994).
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been verified.86 Each test result, consistent with the hypothesis,
increases the scientific community's confidence that the other test
findings are the product of the validity of the hypothesis rather than
artifact.8 7 In this context, it is wholly appropriate for the testifying
researcher to rely on the corroborative opinion of the nontestifying
researcher. The testifying researcher is in a better position than any lay
juror or judge to determine whether the other researcher has observed
proper scientific test procedure, and the testifying researcher may
legitimately consider the fact that the hypothesis of general causation
has "withstood [another] thoughtful effort[] at falsification." 8 The
determination of the validity of the hypothesis of general causation is
"an exercise in scientific analysis" proper.8 9 Reliance on findings on the
same issue by other researchers is an integral part of the way Newtonian science works in practice.90
On the other hand, the admission of corroborative opinions is
incompatible with the narrow view of the scope of Rule 703. 9' The
expert is no longer attempting to testify as to general causation. Rather,
the expert is endeavoring to opine on special causation; assuming the
scientific hypothesis of general causation, the expert proposes to discount
other possible causative factors and attribute Mrs. Daubert's psychosis
to the anguish she experienced upon realizing Jason's limb defects.
The trustworthiness of the opinion as to special causation depends in
part on the same factors which the trier of fact is expected to evaluate.
How credible was Mr. Daubert's statement that Mrs. Daubert's previous
medical history contained no evidence of another possible cause? How
dependable was Mrs. Daubert's memory of the onset of one of the
symptoms? In making these determinations, the expert is not in a
position superior to that of the lay trier of fact:
Does the physician's medical degree make the physician a better judge
of character than the judge or jury? A physician's medical school
coursework does not include any specialized training in determining
credibility. Thfis] determination... is predominantly an exercise in
factual analysis rather than true scientific analysis. To make that
determination, the expert temporarily "step[s] into the shoes of the

factfinder" at trial. We do not assign that final determination to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 753-74.
Imwinkelried, Bases, supra note 45, at 10-11.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly

EpistemologicalApproach to Ensuringthe Reliabilityof Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2277, 2279-80 (1994).

91. See Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 248 n.60.
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experts because the determination amounts to "factfinding, not the
application of expertise." Empowering experts to finally decide the[se]
facts ... would "usurp[] and derogate[] the function of the factfinder."92
It is proper for a testifying expert to draw on another expert's research
on the identical question to support a conclusion that a scientific
hypothesis of general causation is valid. However, it is improper for the
testifying expert to rely on another expert's credibility determinations to
support her decision to accept Mr. Daubert's statement or trust Mrs.
Daubert's memory. Those determinations lie within the expertise of
neither the witness on the stand, nor the expert whom that witness
consulted; those determinations are peculiarly for the trier of fact. In
the case of the testifying expert, the opponent can at least cross-examine
to elicit facts relevant to the determination. For example, the opponent
might force the testifying expert to admit the patient had difficulty
remembering the precise date of the onset of a symptom. However, the
opponent cannot question the nontestifying expert, and the trier of fact
is therefore denied the opportunity to second-guess the credibility of the
case-specific information on which that expert relied. Thus, if facts or
data mean such case-specific information as the subjects of the
statement or recollection, corroborative opinions should arguably be
excluded.
The upshot is that the resolution of this split of authority is closely
tied to the position the court takes on the threshold question of the scope
of Rule 703. If the court opts for the broad view, extending Rule 703 to
scientific research data, at least in some cases corroborative opinion may
legitimately serve as a basis for the testifying expert's opinion; the
scientific process of validating a hypothesis has an iterative quality, and
findings by other researchers investigating the very same question may
figure in an expert's evaluation of the hypothesis. However, if the court
adopts the narrow view restricting Rule 703 to case-specific data, the
admission of corroborative opinion is suspect at best. On that assumption, the nontestifying expert has assessed the credibility of case-specific
evidence such as statements by patients purporting to recall earlier
symptoms. That assessment is ordinarily the province of the trier of
fact, and admitting a corroborative opinion by a nontestifying expert
invades that province.

92. Imwinkelried, Bases, supra note 45, at 11 (brackets in original) (quoting in part
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1313, 1342, 1349, 1368
(E.D. Pa. 1980), aftd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in
part, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
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B. Split of Authority #2: Whether the Judge May Pass on the
Credibility of the Specific Data the Expert Consideredin Addition to
Deciding Whether the Expert Considereda Proper "73pe" of Data
The split of authority discussed in subpart A relates to the first
sentence in Rule 703. The second sentence of the rule has spawned even
more controversy; the text of that sentence has given rise to no less than
three splits of authority. That sentence reads: "If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence."93 The third and fourth words in the sentence, "a type," are
the source of one split of authority.
The Split of Authority. The only inquiry which the statute
expressly asks the judge to make is whether the expert contemplates
considering a generic "type" of information which experts in her specialty
reasonably rely on. Suppose the judge is satisfied that the type or
category of information satisfies this standard. May the judge nevertheless bar reliance on the information when there are grave doubts about
the credibility of the specific data? The courts are divided over this
question."
Some courts empower the trial judge to consider the
trustworthiness of the specific data, as well as the general reliability of
the category of data.95 Other courts draw a negative implication from
the statutory language, reasoning that the only inquiry expressly
authorized is an evaluation of the generic category of data, and therefore
the statute precludes the judge from going farther and examining the
trustworthiness of the particular data."
97
The differing opinions filed in Christophersenv. Allied-Signal Corp.
illustrate the dispute. The plaintiffs in Christophersen were the
surviving relatives of a former employee of Marathon Manufacturing
Company. The employee had died of cancer. The cancer originated in
his colon but had then metastasized to his liver. While he worked for
Marathon, the employee was exposed to cadmium and nickel fumes. The
plaintiffs contended the exposure was the cause of the employee's cancer
and death. As in Daubert, the plaintiffs attempted to establish both
general and special causation. On the general causation issue, the
plaintiffs proffered evidence that exposure to cadmium and nickel fumes

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

FED. R. EviD. 703.
Epps, supra note 27, at 54.
Id. at 75 n.98.
Id. at 76 n.99.
939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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can cause small-cell cancer of the colon. On the special causation
question, the plaintiffs proffered a coemployee's affidavit describing the
extent of the decedent's exposure to the fumes. The plaintiff's expert,
Dr. Miller, acknowledged that "the level and duration of the patient's
exposure are important considerations when evaluating the effect of
exposure to a toxic substance.""8 The trial judge refused to allow Dr.
Miller to opine based on the contents of the affidavit."
On appeal, the majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the trial judge's refusal."° The majority attacked the reliability of the
information set out in the coemployee's affidavit and ruled that even if
the plaintiff's experts had considered "the types of information upon
which experts reasonably rely when forming opinions on the subject,...
the district court was [nevertheless] justified in excluding Dr. Miller's
opinion ...

based upon ...

grossly inaccurate dosage or duration

data." 01 Even assuming arguendo that as a general proposition an
expert might rely on exposure data furnished by fellow workers, the
majority concluded that the specific data contained in this affidavit was
°
vague and "plainly untrustworthy."'O
In his separate opinion, Chief Judge Clark protested the majority's
conclusion." 3 He asserted that the plain meaning of the statutory
language precluded the trial judge from even considering the credibility
of the specific information on which Dr. Miller proposed resting his
opinion. As Chief Judge Clark construed Rule 703, the trial judge's
scope of inquiry is narrowly confined to the type of information on which
the expert relies. Chief Judge Clark stated that "[tihe court's inquiry is
not whether experts in the relevant field would reasonably rely on the
particular facts or data used by the expert witness."1 ° '
Arguments can be advanced for both interpretations of this passage in
the second sentence of Rule 703. Daubert contains a general mandate
05
that judges police or screen the reliability of scientific testimony.
The expert's reliance on a wholly untrustworthy category of information
can certainly undermine the reliability of the expert's opinion, and, as
a matter of logic, it would seem that the expert's consideration of specific
inaccurate information could have the same effect. Moreover, Federal

98. 939 F.2d at 1113.

99. Ild
100. hL
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1113.
Christophersen,939 F.2d at 1116 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1118.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
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Rule of Evidence 403 allows the judge to exclude evidence in her
discretion when the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by
prejudicial dangers. It could be argued that doubts about the reliability
of the specific information the expert considered can diminish the
probative value of the expert's opinion to the point that it becomes
vulnerable to a Rule 403 objection.
However, there are counterpoints. To begin with, the prevailing view
is that the judge may not factor the credibility of an item of evidence
into her assessment of its probative value." s The judge may consider
factors that are evident on the face of the proffered testimony, such as
its indefiniteness, or remoteness in time or place from the key events
involved in the litigation. However, most courts that have reached the
question have decided that under Rule 403, the judge may not weigh the
credibility of the evidence-that evaluation is the task of the trier of
fact. 107 Furthermore, unlike several other provisions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 703 does not expressly authorize the judge to
consider the trustworthiness of specific data. Only three hearsay
exceptions-Rules 803(6) and (7) dealing with business entries, and Rule
803(8) governing official records--contain such an authorization."'8 All
three statutes include language to the effect that even when there is a
prima facie foundation, the trial judge may exclude the proffered
evidence if "the [particular] sources of information or other circumstanc°
es indicate lack of trustworthiness."'O
There is no corresponding
language in Rule 703, and the contrast strengthens the inference that
the drafters intended to limit the judicial inquiry to the general type of
information the expert proposes considering.
The Relationship Between the Resolution of this Split of
Authority and the Question of the Scope of Rule 703. The point
of this Article, though, is that the courts cannot effectively resolve these
splits of authority until they have defined the scope of Rule 703. Like
the division of sentiment over the admissibility of corroborative opinions,
this split of authority proves the point.
Initially, assume the narrow view of the scope of Rule 703 as the
starting point. On that assumption, Rule 703 applies only to casespecific information. If Rule 703's scope is so limited, grave problems

106. Edward J.Imwinkelried, The MeaningofProbativeValue and Prejudicein Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?,
41 VAND. L. REv. 879, 886-87 (1988) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Meaningof Probative
Value].
107. Id. at 856-57 & n.54.
108. FED. R. EvD. 803(6), (7), (8).
109. Id.
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exist in allowing the judge to pass on the credibility of the specific
information on which the expert contemplates relying."0 Again, the
information is case-specific data such as information indicating Mrs.
Daubert ingested Bendectin rather than another antinausea drug, or
that Jason was born with particular types of limb defects. This
information relates to facts about the historical merits of the case; those
issues coincide exactly with ultimate facts determining liability. They
are the very facts set out in the complaint. In our trial system, the jury
traditionally evaluates the credibility of the testimony relevant to the
ultimate facts. Since the Sixth and Seventh Amendments secure
constitutional rights to jury trial, reading Rule 703 as allowing the trial
judge to assess the credibility of this information raises serious concerns
about the constitutionality of Rule 703."'
In many cases, though, the concerns would evaporate if the court
adopted the broad view of the scope of Rule 703. Under that view, Rule
703 applies to research data and case-specific data. The questions
related to research data-questions such as the size and composition of
the database-are mentioned nowhere in the pleadings. They are not
ultimate facts on the merits of the case. These questions are farther
removed from the merits; they determine the reliability of an evidentiary
datum offered to prove an ultimate fact. Empowering the judge to pass
on the trustworthiness of the specific research data the expert considered
represents much less of an intrusion on the jury's traditional fact finding
role.
As in the case of the split of authority over corroborative opinions, an
analysis of this split leads back to the question of the scope of Rule 703.
In particular, the adoption of the narrow view of the scope of Rule 703
cuts strongly against allowing the trial judge to inquire into the
reliability of the specific information that the expert considered. Under
the narrow view, excluding corroborative opinions to prevent the expert
from usurping the jury's right to evaluate the credibility of the casespecific information is advisable. Likewise, under the narrow view, it
would be sound to confine judicial inquiry to the reliability of the general
category of information, preventing the judge from usurping the jury's
right.

110. Epps, supra note 27, at 78.
111.

22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5220, at 306 (1978).
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C. Split of Authority #3: Whether the Trial Judge May Preclude the
Expert from Consideringa 7ype of Information Even if it is the
Customary Practiceof the Expert's Specialty to Rely on That 7ype of
Information
Subpart B noted the controversy triggered by the words "a type" at the
beginning of the second sentence in Rule 703. The third split of
authority arises from the language immediately following those two
words: "If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject ...

.'12

The

issue is the definition of "reasonably."'
The Split of Authority. Like the issues of corroborative opinions
and the scope of judicial inquiry, the definition of "reasonably" has
divided the courts." 4 There are three schools of judicial thought on
the definition.
The liberal school equates "reasonably" with "regularly"' or "customarily."1 6 It is true that under this view, the judge must make a
finding of fact as to whether it is the customary practice of the expert's
specialty to factor a particular type of data into the reasoning process.117 But once the judge finds that the custom exists, the judge's
hands are tied. The judge must permit the expert to utilize data falling
within that category, even if the judge entertains doubts about the
reliability of that kind of information."' According to this view, the
judge may not independently determine the reliability of the type of
information." 9 The proponents of this school find some support in the

112. FED. R. EVID. 703.
113. Epps, supra note 27, at 60.
114. Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 873 n.68; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the
Bases ofModern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 588 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson,
Policing];Comment, What Is the Status of 'Inadmissible" Bases of Expert Testimony?, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 531, 536-39 (1994).
115. Epps, supra note 27, at 78.
116. Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 582; Carlson, Collision Course,supra note 25,
at 240 n.23. See United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996,1002 (11th Cir. 1987) ("customarily
rely").

117. Edward J. Imwinkelried, DeterminingPreliminaryFactsUnderFederalRule 104,
45 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 49 (1992).
118. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275-79 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted in partsub nom, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radiu Corp., 471 U.S.
1002 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). But see In re Paoli RR Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1994) (overruling In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig. on this

point), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995).
119. Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 583; Epps, supra note 27, at 76.
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Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703. This Note states that
one of the purposes of Rule 703 is "to bring judicial practice into line
with the practice of experts themselves when not in court.""' ° Construing reasonably as if it read customarily makes the practices coincide
perfectly.
The competing, restrictive school advocates that "reasonably" denotes
objective reliability rather than customary practice. These courts
concede that the specialty's customary practice is relevant and entitled
to "due regard,"'' but they deny that this factor is dispositive.'1
The courts subscribing to this school believe the trial judge should
actively police the basis of the expert's opinion rather than passively
deferring to the specialty's customary practice.123 Accordingly, the
trial judge must independently assess the reasonableness of relying on
M
This school is probably the majority view
that type of information."
2
in the United States.'
A third, compromise school exists. These courts regard the specialty's
customary practice as such "strong evidence" 26 of reasonableness that
proof of the custom gives rise to a formal presumption of reasonableness. 2 ' The presumption is rebuttable, but in practice, these courts
ordinarily uphold the specialty's customary practice. 128 Formally
129
however, the judge retains the power to reject the experts' practice.
In the past, the battle over this issue has been fought without regard
to the relationship the battle has to the threshold question concerning
the definition of facts or data. While the advocates of the liberal school
point to the Advisory Committee Note, the proponents of the restrictive
view have made counter-arguments. One counter-argument rests on the
wording of other Federal Rules provisions, notably, Rules 406 and
803(17). Rule 406 governs the admission of habit evidence, 13 and
803(17) creates a hearsay exception for commercial publications
"generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular
This counter-argument runs that when the drafters
occupations."''

120. FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
121.

Epps, supra note 27, at 61.

122. Id.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 859.
Epps, supra note 27, at 61, 75 n.98, 79.
Id. at 79 n.110.
Id. at 78, 81.
Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1247 (N.J. 1990).
Epps, supra note 27, at 77 n.104, 78; Carlson, Policing, supra note 114, at 578.
Epps, supra note 27, at 78.
FED. R. EVID. 406.
FED. R. EviD. 803(17).
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wanted to elevate customary practice to the status of a test, they found
apt words to manifest their desire. The drafters did not write similar
wording into Rule 703; instead, they chose the term, "reasonably." In
a tort case, when the issue is whether a defendant business was
negligent, the defendant may offer testimony that its practice was
32
customary."
The customary nature of the practice is some relevant
evidence that the practice is objectively reasonable."
However,
ultimately, the custom is not controlling."3 4 The judge possesses the
power to assess the practice independently and second guess the
industry's custom. 3 5 The restrictive and compromise schools accord
the judge the same ultimate decisionmaking power under Rule 703.
The Relationship Between the Resolution of this Split of
Authority and the Question of the Scope of Rule 703. This battle
ought not occur in a vacuum, divorced from the fundamental question of
the scope of Rule 703. Although the meaning of "facts or data" does not
dictate the meaning of reasonably, the courts' positions on the meaning
of facts or data are as pertinent here as they were under the previous
split of authority; while the narrow view of "facts or data" is compatible
with all three schools on the interpretation of reasonably, the broad view
is at odds with the liberal school's making the specialty's practice
controlling.
At first blush, the inconsistency between the broad view and the
liberal school may not be evident; on close scrutiny however, the
inconsistency becomes clear if we think back to Daubert.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court dealt with the evidentiary standard
that determines when an expert may rest her testimony on a scientific
theory or technique.136 The Court affirmatively held that Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 supplies the standard;'3 7 the underlying theory or
technique must qualify as "scientific... knowledge" derived from sound
scientific methodology.'38 Negatively, the Court declared that the
traditional general acceptance test is no longer good law.'
Under
that test, the consensus or custom within the scientific field was disposi-

132. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS

(5th ed. 1984).
133. Id. at 195.
134.
135.
136,
137.

Id.
Id. at 194 n.11.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
Id. at 2793.

138. Id. at 2796-97.
139. Id. at 2799.

§ 33, at 193
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tive.' 4 If the consensus was that the technique is valid, the technique
passed muster; but conversely, when the consensus was lacking, the test
obliged the judge to exclude the testimony even if impressed by the
extent and quality of the scientific research supporting the hypothesis
that the technique is valid."' Under the new Rule 702 standard, the
extent and quality of the scientific research are determinative. 4 2 As
previously stated, commentators concur that on the facts of Daubert,the
new empirical validation standard applies at least to the question of the
accuracy of the validation methodology used by the plaintiffs' experts,
that is, epidemiological re-analysis.' 4
Post-Daubert,would it make sense for a court subscribing to the broad
interpretation of "facts or data" to equate "reasonably" with customarily?
If a court favors the broad meaning of "facts or data," it will extend Rule
703 to at least some of the questions related to the research data-the
quantity of the pooled epidemiological data that the plaintiffs' experts reanalyzed, the quality of the data, and the strength of the inferences from
the data. Like the issue of the validity of epidemiological re-analysis,
these questions are technical issues falling outside the normal ken of
laypersons.'" Scientific learning exists concerning the questions of the
proper collection of research data, 5 the requisite size of a database, "' and the proper statistical methods for inferring correlations. 47 Daubert teaches that the issue of the validity of epidemiological re-analysis must be decided under Rule 702's empirical validation
test, not the old general acceptance or consensus test. However, if the
court liberally interprets "reasonably" as customarily, a consensus will
determine the other questions.
If a court adopts the broad interpretation of "facts or data," embracing
the liberal view of "reasonably" would introduce an anomaly into the law
of scientific evidence. The validity of epidemiological re-analysis, the
adequacy of the size of the database, and the inference of a statistical
showing of causation from the database are

140.

1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELPJED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (2d

ed. 1993).

141. Id.
142. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799.
143. Chesebro, Daubert's 'Focus,' supra note 41.
144. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 373-74.
145. See 1 PAuL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 154 (2d ed. 1993).
146. Id. § 15-4(B).
147. Id. § 15-6(A).
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all .. essential components of the scientist's [reasoning] .... Under
a broad interpretation of Rule 703 [extending it to research data],
courts might continue to subject those components of the scientific
reasoning process to Frye's popularity test. If consensus and popularity
are not the criterion for passing on the general validity of epidemiological re-analysis,
they surely should not be the litmus test for these other
1 48
components.
In subparts A and B, we saw that what is really at stake is the jury's
traditional role in evaluating the credibility of the testimony relevant to
the ultimate facts. Allowing the testifying expert to refer to corroborative opinions threatens that role, as would permitting the judge to pass
on the believability of case-specific information that the expert considers.
So too, the judge's traditional role warrants protection. Daubert
underscored that tradition; the Court announced that the trial judge
must play an independent gate-keeping role in screening out unreliable
scientific evidence.' 49 Daubert instructs the trial judge that she may
consider the general acceptance of a scientific theory in deciding whether
to expose the jury to testimony premised on the theory.'
However,
the Court makes it clear that general acceptance is merely a factor-it
no longer enjoys the status of serving as the exclusive criterion for
admissibility.'
The decision in Daubert reaffirms the trial judge's
essential responsibility of deciding whether proffered evidence is reliable
enough to be admissible.'52 This is an inherently judicial decision,
especially in a jurisdiction extending Rule 703 to research data. Facilely
equating reasonably and customarily would shift some of that decisionmaking authority from the judge to the expert.
D. Split of Authority #4: Whether the Expert's ProponentMay
Formally Introduce Any Technically InadmissibleInformation Which
the Expert Reasonably Relies Upon
Assume the expert contemplates relying on technically inadmissible
hearsay information such as an oral report by a nurse or laboratory
technician. The trial judge determines that albeit technically inadmissible, the information is nevertheless the type of data "reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject ... .""' Everyone would agree that the expert may

148. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 376.
149. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-99.
150. Id. at 2797.

151. Id. at 2796-98.
152. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives, 99 F.R.D. 208 (1983).
153. FED. R. EVD. 703.
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then testify to the opinion based on that data; 54 the opinion itself is
admissible as substantive proof.155 Perhaps most would also agree
that in general terms, the expert could describe the type of information
he relied upon in forming the opinion. 56 For example, the expert
could state that he had considered verbal descriptions by ambulance
attendants and nurses of the patient's symptoms. The point of
controversy is over whether to permit the expert to quote the hearsay
verbal reports on direct examination.'5 7 Or suppose that the nurse
had reduced her report to writing. Could the attorney calling the
physician introduce the nurse's report into evidence simply because the
physician attests to his reliance on the report in reaching his opinion? ' Those questions have sparked the fourth split of authority.
The Split of Authority. The split of authority relates to the
concluding language in the second sentence of Rule 703: "Ifof a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence."'59 The quoted language does not explicitly
state whether the expert's proponent may formally introduce the
technically inadmissible information constituting the basis of the expert's
opinion.' 6o As in the case of the split of authority over the scope of
judicial inquiry, this split of authority turns on the propriety of an
implication from the statutory language: Did the drafters mean to imply
that although the data is technically inadmissible, it may be formally
admitted and submitted to the jury? As in the case of the split of
authority over the meaning of "reasonably," the courts have split into
several camps. The courts and commentators are even more badly
divided over this issue. Indeed, there are four distinct camps.
Professor Carlson has championed the most conservative camp. His
position is that on direct examination, the expert may not elaborately

154. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 239-40.
155. Epps, supra note 27, at 54.
156. Carlson, Conduits,supra note 31, at 869; Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25,
at 251; Carlson, Policing, supra note 114, at 584 n.23.
157. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 234; Comment, What Is the Status of
"Inadmissible"Bases of Expert Testimony?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 539-41 (1994).
158. Professor Ronald L. Carlson has pondered analogous situations where the question
of whether oral and written reports which lack proper foundation may be admitted directly

into evidence because a testifying expert relied on such reports in forming his or her
opinion. See Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 234, 237, 242, 250-51; Carlson,
Policing,supra note 114, at 583-84.
159. FED. R. EviD. 703.
160. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 235.
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describe the bases of the opinion unless the information happens to be
independently admissible. 16 ' He points out that in these situations, ex
hypothesi the information is technically inadmissible since it is usually
objectionable as hearsay.' 62 He concedes that it is theoretically
possible to permit a detailed description of the information while
providing the jury a limiting instruction that they may not treat the
information as substantive evidence."6 However, he fears that such
a "refined distinction will likely escape the jury." ' If so, there is a
grave risk that the jurors will misuse the testimony as substantive evidence. 6' He finds no evidence that the drafters intended to create a
giant, back door hearsay exception;'6 although Rules 803 and 804
enumerate tens of exceptions, there is no exception for information
serving as the basis of an expert opinion. Little federal case law
supports Professor Carlson's view," but some state courts, particularly California, adhere to his position."
Moreover, in a number of
jurisdictions, the state amended its version of Rule 703 to incorporate
Professor Carlson's view. The amended Kentucky and Minnesota
versions of Rule 703 embody such a view."6 9
Professor Epps has served as the leading apologist for the second
camp. 7' To an extent, Professor Epps disagrees with Professor Carlson. Construing Rule 703 in light of Rule 705, she contends that the
drafters contemplated that the expert would be permitted to give a
detailed account of the information underlying the opinion; she asserts:
[A]dmitting the factors relied upon by the expert brings coherence to
the Rules of Evidence. Rule 705, in a dramatic break from the
cumbersome practice of eliciting expert testimony through the use of

161. Id. at 249 n.60; Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 863.
162. However, in some cases, the difficulty may be that there is inadequate
authentication of the writing. Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 584.
163. Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 861 n.22.
164. Id. at 865 n.36.
165. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 243 n.34. See Regina A. Schuller,
Expert Evidence and Hearsay: The Influence of "Secondhand' Information on Jurors'
Decisions, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 345 (1995).
166. Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 585,592-93; see also Carlson, Conduits,supra
note 31, at 872.
167. Epps, supra note 27, at 63 & n.49. But see Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d
526, 531 (7th Cir. 1995).
168. People v. Campos, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 114-15 (1995); Lloyd's Ins. Co. v.
MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. 1989); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., CALFORNIA
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 257-58 (2d ed. 1994).
169. 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTzBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 52.2 (1994 Cum. Supp.).

170. See generally Epps, supra note 27.
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hypotheticals, permits the expert to offer her opinion without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. If the facts or data underlying the expert's opinion were not
to be routinely disclosed, there would be no need for a rule of sequence
that placed the opinion before disclosure of the facts. Moreover, if the
only facts or data that could be considered as the basis of the expert's
opinion were those that were already admitted in evidence, there would
be no need for the rule to say that the expert need not disclose them.
Thus, Rule 705 would have been nonsensical unless it contemplated the
inadmissible facts or data underlying
routine disclosure of17otherwise
1
the expert's opinion.
She concludes that in the typical case, the expert may detail the bases
of the opinion, but that under Rule 105 the trial judge should instruct
the jury that they may consider this testimony only for the limited
172
purpose of evaluating the quality of the expert's reasoning process.
However, Professor Epps shares Professor Carlson's concern that the
jury might misuse the testimony as substantive proof. She does not
believe, though, that the statutory scheme addresses that concern by
invariably requiring a detailed mention of the bases of the opinion.
Rather, she concludes that the drafters intended that trial judges would
meet the concern by exercising their power under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.173 As previously stated, Rule 403 empowers the judge
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when the judge concludes that
the incidental prejudicial dangers substantially outweigh the probative
worth of the item of evidence. 1 4 A premier prejudicial danger is the
risk that the jury will misuse the evidence. 175 With few exceptions, 176 all proffered evidence is subject to discretionary exclusion
under Rule 403.177 Thus, the judge has the power to bar a detailed
description of the underlying bases of the expert's opinion when the
judge believes there is a realistic danger the jurors will treat the
Exclusion under Rule 403,
testimony as substantive evidence. 78
however, is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. There is a
strong statutory construction argument that the drafters intended judges

171. Id. at 71.
172. Id. at 72.
173. Id. at 70.
174. FED. R. EvID. 403.

175. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
176. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504

(1989).
177. Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33
FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1974) (Rule 403 "apparently cuts across the entire body of the Rules").

178. Epps, supra note 27, at 70 n.79, 84.
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to employ Rule 403 sparingly,179 excluding evidence only in extreme
cases's°-a reflection of the Rules' pervasive bias in favor of admitting
logically relevant evidence. 8' After surveying the federal case law,
Professor
Epps concludes that most courts probably subscribe to this
82
camp.

Just as Professor Epps' view is more liberal than Professor Carlson's,
there is a camp embracing a view still more permissive than Professor
Epps'. In part, the courts embracing this view accept Professor Epps'
position; they agree that under Rules 105 and 703, the expert's
proponent is generally entitled to elicit a detailed description of the
bases of the expert's opinion." They further agree that the description may be elicited only for the limited purpose of helping the jury
evaluate the credibility or weight of the expert's testimony.'
The
adherents of this camp reason that informing the jury of the opinion's
bases is "arguably a rational way of enabling the trier [of fact] to
determine the value of that opinion."85 The principal difference
between Professor Epps' view and the approach taken by these courts is
that the courts tend to focus on Rule 105' and overlook Rule 403.
Professor Epps believes that the courts must be vigilant, invoking Rule
403 to guard against the risk that the jurors will misuse the testimony
as substantive evidence. In contrast, once these courts are satisfied that
the testimony comports with the Article VII prescriptions, they tend to
neglect related Rule 403 problems. If a court finds Rule 703 is satisfied,
and slights related Rule 403 problems, in effect the7 expert has license to
freely relate the bases of her opinion to the jury.11

179. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:28 (1984).
180. Id. (1984 & 1995 Cum. Supp.).
181. The bias is sculpted into the key trilogy of provisions, Federal Rules of Evidence
401-03. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to "PleadOut"Issuesand Block the Admission
of PrejudicialEvidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal
Accused as a Denial ofEqualProtection,40 EMORY L.J. 341, 352 n.59 (1991) (Federal Rule
of Evidence 401); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second
Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 (1987) (Federal Rule of Evidence 402). See generally
Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value, supra note 106.
182. Epps, supra note 27, at 68.
183. Carlson, Collision Course, supra note 25, at 241 n.24, 242 (discussing State v.

Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1978)); Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 862 &n.21; Epps,
supra note 27, at 55 n.12, 60.
184. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A
Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 583-84 (1987) [hereinafter Rice,

Response].
185. Carlson, CollisionCourse, supra note 25, at 249 n.60 (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 399 (7th ed. 1983)).
186. Epps, supra note 27, at 67.
187. Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 592.
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However, there is an even more liberal view, urged by Professor
Rice."s Professor Rice argues that the jury should both receive a
detailed recounting of the bases of the expert's opinion and be permitted
to treat that information as substantive evidence.18 9 To begin with,
Professor Rice contends that the jurors must receive an in-depth
description to enable them to intelligently gauge the value of the expert's
opinion.' He adds that once the jury is exposed to such a description,
it is an absurd fiction-a charade-to expect the jury to consider the
information only for credibility purposes. 1 In his mind, the jurors
will regard the limiting instruction as judicial double talk, since logically
they cannot accept the opinion without accepting the underlying
facts. 92 Lastly, he contends that the information deserves the status
of substantive evidence. Pointing to Rule 803(4), codifying a hearsay
exception for certain statements made to physicians, 9" he argues that
experts can separate the wheat from the chaff.'94 The drafters'
approval of Rule 803(4) is an implicit recognition that experts have
"special talents in screening" the trustworthiness of information.'
Thus, the fact that the expert is willing to venture an opinion based on
the information is enough to qualify it for admission under the residual
hearsay exceptions embodied in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5).'9
Professor Epps characterizes Professor Rice's view as the "most
fearsome,"'97 and reports she can locate no cases adopting this
view.' 98

As in the case of the other splits of authority, the disputants in this
controversy have largely conducted their debate without reference to the
definitional question of the meaning of "facts or data" in Rule 703. All
the disputants have advanced contextual arguments, based on other
provisions of the Federal Rules. Professor Carlson analogizes to Rule
That statute governs the handling of
612 to support his position.'
writings used to refresh a witness's recollection."° Under Rule 612,

188. Rice, Response, supra note 184.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 584-85.
Id. at 585 & n.9.
Id. at 585, 596.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 591.
Id
Epps, supra note 27, at 64.
Id.
Carlson, Policing,supra note 114, at 583-86.

200. FED. R. EVID. 612.
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the witness's proponent may merely present the writing to the witness
and invite the witness to read the writing silently to himself or herself.
Only the "adverse party is entitled... to introduce in evidence those
portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.""' Professor
Carlson favors a parallel procedure under Rule 703; the direct examiner
should be forbidden from detailing the bases for the expert's opinion, but
the cross-examiner ought to be allowed to elicit the information. For her
part, Professor Epps stresses the light which Rule 705 can shed on this
split of authority. 0 2 Again, she believes that the wording of Rule 705
indicates the drafters contemplated allowing the direct examiner to elicit
an elaborate description of the bases of the opinion. Lastly, Professor
Rice cites Rule 803(4) to lend analogical support to his position. 0 3 If
the addressee's identity as a physician suffices to justify admitting a
statement under Rule 803(4), a fortiori the addressee's expert status
should permit the substantive introduction of statements qualifying
under Rule 703.
The Relationship Between the Resolution of this Split of
Authority and the Question of the Scope of Rule 703. As the
preceding paragraph demonstrates, most of the contextual arguments
marshalled in the dispute relate to provisions other than Rule 703.
However, in looking beyond Rule 703, these arguments overlook another
critical part of the context, namely, the even more proximate context, the
beginning language in Rule 703 itself referring to "facts or data." A
court's decision whether to adopt the broad or narrow reading of "facts
or data" should influence its resolution of this split of authority.
Simply stated, if a court chose to read "facts or data" narrowly as
subsuming only case-specific data, that choice would cut strongly in
favor of adopting either Professor Carlson's or Professor Epps' position
on the final split of authority, that is, the first two camps. Professor
Carlson has noted the close connection between that choice and the
resolution of this division of authority. Distinguishing "general
[scientific]

theories, research

and studies ...

from case-specific

information," he has argued that the latter type of information is
"particularly subject to exclusion."2°
That argument has great merit. As subpart B pointed out, under the
narrow view of "facts or data," the information constituting facts or data
will usually relate to the ultimate facts on the merits which the jury

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Epps, supra note 27, at 71.
Rice, Response, supra note 184, at 590.
Carlson, Conduits, supra note 31, at 870-71.
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must determine. Revisiting Daubert, the plaintiffs' experts might rely
on information indicating that the drug Mrs. Daubert used was
Bendectin rather than another antinausea medication. This information
could be technically inadmissible hearsay; for example, an out-of-court
declaration by Mr. Daubert that he recalled seeing a bottle labeled
Bendectin in the medicine cabinet he shared with his wife. Of course,
to decide the issue of liability, the jurors must determine the identical
question of whether Mrs. Daubert used the defendant's product,
Bendectin. There would seem to be no applicable hearsay exception that
would permit the introduction of Mr. Daubert's extrajudicial statement
as substantive evidence. If the trial judge allowed the plaintiff's expert
,to describe Mr. Daubert's statement in detail, there is a significant risk
that the jury would treat the testimony as substantive proof of the
identity of the drug that Mrs. Daubert used. In turn, if the linchpin of
the defense was that Mrs. Daubert had used another manufacturer's
product, the misuse of that testimony might be the catalyst for a
wrongful verdict.
However, embracing the broad view of facts or data would make the
third and fourth camps more attractive. Under the broad view, facts or
data encompass the scientific research and studies to which Professor
Carlson alludes. 5 The subject matter of those studies does not
coincide with the ultimate facts alleged in the pleadings. "[Tihe danger
that the jury will misuse the information contained [in the studies] is
minimal, since that information rarely overlaps with the disputed
adjudicative facts in the case."' In Daubert, the pleadings contain no
allegations about the size of databases or statistical inferences from
epidemiological studies; the jury could consider testimony about those
issues in deciding what weight to ascribe to the plaintiff's evidence of
general causation, but there is no risk the admission of that testimony
would spill over into the jury's deliberation on special causation.
In short, while the risk of misuse of evidence is relatively small under
the broad view of facts or data, the magnitude of the risk grows to
significant proportions under the narrow view. In subpart C, we saw
that the dispute over the meaning of "reasonably" implicates the judicial
responsibility to decide whether the substance of proffered evidence is
reliable enough to serve as a trustworthy basis for an expert opinion. By
the same token, the dispute over the exposure of juries to technically
inadmissible information touches upon a peculiarly judicial responsibility. Under Rule 403, it is an essentially judicial responsibility to shield
the jury from testimony that is technically logically relevant but which
205. Id. at 870.
206. Imwinkelried, Bases, supra note 45, at 26.
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realistically is prone to misuse. By construing "reasonably" to prescribe
an objective standard capable of overriding the specialty's customary
practice, the court discharges the traditional judicial duty of ensuring
that the substance of the proffered evidence is reliably probative of a fact
in issue. But at the very least, by following Professor Epps' suggestion
and employing Rule 403 in conjunction with Rule 703, the court
discharges the kindred judicial duty to guard against the risk that the
admission of the evidence will distort the jury's deliberation on another
fact in issue.

III.

CONCLUSION

The courts must come to appreciate the importance of the stakes in
the Rule 703 controversies. The most obvious stake is the coherence of
Rule 703 itself. In the past, most commentators on Rule 703 have
focused on only one of the five different splits of authority in the
published opinions. However, as this Article has demonstrated, these
seemingly distinct issues are closely connected. More specifically, the
other four splits of authority tie back to the fundamental question of how
to define the expression, "[tihe facts or data." Voltaire was right. We
must first define our terms. Until the courts grapple with that question,
they cannot hope to satisfactorily resolve the remaining four controversies. The courts must initially settle that definition. Once they have
selected a definition, they can then develop a coherent structure for Rule
703. On reflection, it will become patent that some of the positions
urged on the other four splits of authority are plainly inconsistent with
the definition and, for that reason, must be rejected out of hand.
In truth, the stakes are greater; they include the coherence of Article
VII of the Federal Rules. As subpart I1.C explained, until the courts
define the expression "facts or data" in Rule 703, they cannot draw the
boundaries between Rules 702 and 703.2o7 Subpart II.D demonstrated
further that the interpretation of Rule 703 also impacts the application
of Rule 705.208 Professor Epps has convincingly argued that Rule 705
sheds light on the proper construction of Rule 703; the wording of "Rule
705 would [be] nonsensical unless it contemplated the routine disclosure
of otherwise inadmissible facts or data underlying the expert's opinThe relationship between Rules 703 and 705 is a two-way
ion.'
street; the text of Rule 703 has a bearing on the proper construction of
Rule 705. Both statutes use the expression, "facts or data."

207. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 375; see also Carlson, Conduits,
supra note 31, at 873.
208. Imwinkelried, Factsor Data,supra note 36, at 375.
209. Epps, supra note 27, at 71.
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Construing the facts or data to include the scientific data as well as the
case-specific data would reduce Rule 705 to an absurdity. Rule 705
explicitly requires the direct examiner to elicit the "reasons" for the
opinion, but construing the facts or data expansively renders that
requirement meaningless. If the facts or data include both the
scientific research underlying the expert's theory or technique and the
case-specific information, there is virtually no information left to which
the term "reasons" can apply. As a practical matter, a broad interpretation of the facts or data obliterates the distinction Rule 705 is
obviously attempting to make.21
Finally, the courts should come to understand that what is really at
stake is the traditional division of labor among the jury, judge, and
expert. The judge's responsibility includes deciding whether an item of
evidence is substantively reliable proof of a fact in issue, and further
whether the jury is likely to misuse the item as proof of another fact.
Equating "reasonably" with customarily diminishes the judicial power to
police the substantive reliability of evidence and transfers some of that
power to the expert. A ruling that the expert's proponent has an
absolute right to elicit a detailed description of any technically inadmissible information that the expert opts to rely on as a basis for her
opinion would constrict judicial power. The recognition of that right
would conflict with the judge's duty to exclude testimony subject to
misuse by the jury. No legislative history even faintly suggests that by
approving Rule 703, the drafters intended to sharply curb the judge's
power and institute trial by expert.2 '
Nor is there any convincing proof that the drafters intended to
radically curtail the jury's power. It is the jury's province to pass on the
credibility of the evidence relevant to the ultimate facts in issue.
Allowing the expert to refer to corroborative opinions by other experts
would impinge upon that power. The nontestifying expert has made
credibility determinations about information relevant to the ultimate
facts, and admitting that expert's opinion through the conduit of the
testifying expert denies the jury the opportunity to second guess the
nontestifying expert's credibility determinations. So too, permitting the
judge to pass on both the reliability of the type of information that the
expert relies on and the trustworthiness of the specific data the expert
considers would imperil the jury's traditional role. The specific data will
often relate to the ultimate facts the jury must resolve, and neither the

210. Imwinkelried, Facts or Data, supra note 36, at 369.
211. See Epps, supra note 27, at 65.
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judge nor the expert should arrogate the power to evaluate the
credibility of such data.
The threats to the traditional division of labor among jury, judge, and
expert emerge with particular clarity if we posit the narrow view of facts
or data. The text and legislative history of Rule 703 are devoid of any
indication the drafters wanted to work a profound realignment of the
roles of the jury, judge, and expert. The drafters respected the
traditional roles but wanted to effect modest improvements to modernize
expert testimony. Cumulatively, the various shifts in decision making
power would revolutionize the American trial. 12 Here too, the courts
can learn from Voltaire. To a degree, his rationalism paved the way for
the French Revolution;2 13 his writings helped inspire the rise of liberal
thought on the Continent.2 14 Yet Voltaire himself distrusted revolutionary movements. 1 5 Voltaire neither foresaw nor advocated the
coming upheaval.216
He favored slow but steady progress and
reform. 217 A gradual, reformist approach is often as advisable in law
as it is in politics.
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